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Multinationals in Brazil
J. M. Pinheiro Neto*
B RAZIL IS A developing country with a present population
of roughly 105 million and is growing at the rate of 2.9 percent
per year. Perhaps 35 million should be considered as an active
economic population but this is increasing continuously so that a
considerable and expanding internal market already exists. The
greater part of the population (more than half) is under 21 years
of age, and this requires at least one million new jobs per year.
For this reason, and also because of Brazil's political and economic
stability, the country has been an interesting attraction to multi-
national corporations (MNC). Few of the 500 largest American
industrials, as published by FORTUNE, 1 and the 300 largest non-
American companies, are absent from Brazil. An examination of
MNCs in Brazil is nothing more than a study of foreign invest-
ment in the country. Brazil is a capital importing country and
the present rules by which capital is brought into the country may
be of interest to those who study MNCs outside their country of
origin.
The basic legislation in regard to foreign investment in Brazil
is Law No. 41312 of September 3, 1962, as amended by Law No.
43903 of August 29, 1964 and regulated by Decree No. 55.7624
of February 17, 1965. It should be noted that Law No. 4131
was passed after considerable discussion not only by the interested
parties but in Congress also. Times were then difficult for Brazil,
for the President of the Republic had suddenly withdrawn from
office and the Vice-President who took over had well-known leftist
* Member of Brazil Bar; L.L.B. 1938, University of Slo Paulo School of Law;
B.A. Col~gio Sao Bento; senior partner, Pinheiro Neto & Cia., Avogados with
offices in S~o Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Brasilia, Assuncion, London and Paris.
[ed. note-At the author's request, this article was not edited for style.]
IFortune's Directory of The 500 Largest U. S. Industrial Corporations, FORTUNE,
May, 1975, at 208.
2 Lei de Capital Estrangeiro, 5 Cole o das Leis 117 (1962) [hereinafter cited
as Coleqao]. See annotated English translation, Brazilian Remittance of Profits
Law, in P. GARLAND, A BusINESSMEN'S INTRODUCTION TO BRAZILIAN LAW AND
PRACTICE 153 (1966) [hereinafter cited as GARLAND].
3 5 Coleqo 97 (1964). See also GARLAND, supra note 2, at 153.
4 Capitais Estrangeiros no Brasil/Legislaqao, Diario Oficial da Uniao 1, 1, at
1998 (Feb. 18, 1965) [hereinafter cited as D.O.U.]. See annotated English
translation, Regulations Under the Remittance of Profits Law, in GARLAND, supra
note 2, at 165.
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inclinations which he was attempting to put into practice. Na-
tionalistic feeling was apparently high and this had its effects on
the first law. The main thrust of 4131 was that foreign capital
could be accepted, but the results obtained could not be considered
as an addition to the original investment. At the time, the opin-
ion of many was that the appearance of a law attempting to set
rules for foreign capital in Brazil would create impediments for
other and greater investment from abroad of which the country
was in need. The change that took place in 1964 eliminated the
more obnoxious provisions and later years confirmed that the
worries voiced at the time had no foundation in fact.
Brazil went through considerable turmoil in 1964 and a new
government took over. Since then the country has seen political
stability and, from an economic point of view, Brazil has been
developing steadily at a great pace. From the very beginning,
the new government sought to correct the excesses that had been
committed and this is why Law No. 4390 was passed. The rules
of the game, in all that is of interest to foreign investment in
Brazil, are thus quite well-known by now. MNCs have no dif-
ficulty in recognizing the guidelines which govern their activity
in the country.
All business organizations created in Brazil are, by law, Bra-
zilian and subject to local laws. So are the branches of foreign
organizations duly authorized to do business in the country.5
Due to the difficulties encountered in the creation of branches,
their number is small and decreasing except in activities in which
they are required, such as in air traffic and some shipping activ-
ities. The foreign banks operating in Brazil are also branches of
their parent organizations.
No distinction should exist in Brazil between foreign and local
investment. This is clearly stated in article 2 of Law No. 4131,
which reads: "Foreign capital invested in the country will receive
the same treatment before the law as that granted to Brazilian
capital under similar conditions; any discrimination not provided
for in the present law is prohibited."6
5 Lei de Introdulo ao C6digo Civil Brasileiro, Decree-Law No. 4657 of
Sept. 4, 1942, art. 11, D.O.U. 1.1, (1942) (Law of Introduction to the Brazilian
Civil Code). See also Decree-Law No. 2627 of Sept. 26, 1940, art. 60 (Brazilian
Commercial Code). See annotated English translation, Of the Corporation or
Company Whose Operation is Dependent on Government Authorization, in GARLAND,
supra note 2, at 200. Annual editions of both the Civil and Commercial Codes
are published by Edigo Saraiva.
6 Lei de Capital Estrangeiro, supra note 2 (translation by the author).
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Foreign investment in Brazil can be made in cash or in any
kind of goods, machinery and equipment brought into the country
without a disbursement of foreign exchange and intended for the
production of goods and services. In some special cases it has
been known that technical know-how, patents and trademarks
have been registered as a foreign investment in Brazil but this
becomes permissible only after a long and difficult process be-
fore the National Institute of Industrial Property (INPI), and the
Central Bank of Brazil. Besides this, the total amount of the in-
vestment in know-how is also subject to a 25 percent withholding
tax at the source that makes it exceedingly costly.7 It is for these
reasons that there have been so few registered foreign investments
through the transfer of know-how and patents.
Registration of the foreign investment is essential. This is
carried out by the Central Bank of Brazil' and is by now a routine
matter. A request for registration should be made within 30 days
after the arrival of the plant and equipment, or after the exchange
contract by which funds are brought into Brazil.8 Companies
established in Brazil for a long time, many years before the enact-
ment of Law No. 4131, have had considerable problems in provid-
ing proof of the entry into Brazil of the funds which they now
ask to be registered as foreign investment.
Registration of the foreign investment is made in the currency
which was sent to Brazil; reinvestments derived from this initial
investment are registered in the currency of the country of origin
of the investor.9 The corresponding value in cruzeiros is also in-
dicated as well as the number of shares purchased or acquired
with the investment. If a premium is paid at the time of acquisi-
tion, and this is also paid in foreign currency, the registration is
for the full amount. In this case some problems may occur with
the Central Bank for the registration of profits obtained at a
later date and corresponding to the premium paid. The invest-
ment may be made either directly into an existing corporation by
a direct issue of new shares, or it may also be made by the pur-
chase of existing shares from a shareholder in the company. In
both cases there is an entry into Brazil of foreign funds and the
7 Regulamento do Imposto sobre a Renda e Proventos de Qualquer Natureza
(Brazilian Income Tax Law), art. 343, 344, approved by Decree No. 76,186 of
Sept. 2, 1975, 6 Coleqao 224 (1975).
1 Lei de Capital Estrangeiro, art. 5, supra note 2. See also GARLAND, supra
note 2, at 154.
9 Lei de Capital Estrangeiro, art. 4, supra note 2. See also GARLAND, supra
note 2, at 154.
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total amount so entering the country is registered as foreign invest-
ment.
Once registration has been obtained it is possible to remit to
the person or company that made the investment the result of its
participation in a Brazilian concern. Profits may be remitted
after payment of the applicable income tax withheld at the source,
which is usually at the rate of 25 percent. When a treaty for
the avoidance of double taxation exists with the country to which
the remittance is to be made the tax is reduced to 15 percent, or to 10
percent in the case of Japan. 10 This tax is applicable when the
remittance, considered as an average over a 3 year period, does
not exceed 12 percent net of the amount registered in foreign cur-
rency. It should be kept in mind that the capital of Brazilian
companies is expressed in local currency, namely cruzeiros, and due
to inflation, this capital is subject to indexing or "monetary correc-
tion" as it is called in Brazil. The application of "monetary
correction" causes an increase in the number of shares issued but
this has no effect on the registration in the foreign currency. Only
when existing profits are capitalized, and bonus shares issued, do
the initial and later registrations change to the extent of the rein-
vestment. This is computed in the foreign currency of the initial
investment at the mean rate of exchange prevailing between the
time the profits were ascertained in accordance with the year end
balance sheet and the date of their capitalization. The distribu-
tion of profits at the end of a financial period may be the
equivalent in cruzeiros of 16 percent of the foreign investment; this
total is then subject to the 25 percent withholding tax, leaving a
net of 12 percent to be remitted to the foreign shareholder. Re-
mittances in excess of this percentage are also allowed but they
then become subject to a supplementary tax which ranges from
10The general 25 percent rate is established by the Brazilian Income Tax
Law, art. 344, supra note 6. Exceptions are made by special treaties for the
avoidance of double taxation that Brazil has entered into with other countries.
The 10 percent rate was established with Japan by Decree No. 61,899 of Dec. 14,
1967, art. 9.
The following countries have treaties with Brazil establishing a 15 percent
rate: Portugal, Decree No. 69,393 of Oct. 21, 1971, art. 10, 8 Coleqo 78 (1971);
France, Decree No. 70,506 of May 12, 1972, art. 10, 4 Cole 5o 88 (1972); Bel-
gium, Decree No. 72,542 of July 30, 1973, art. 10, 6 Coleco 244 (1973); Aus-
tria, Decree No. 78,107 of July 22, 1976, D.O.U. 1.1, at 9768 (July 23, 1976);
Spain, Decree No. 76,975 of Jan. 2, 1976, art. 10, D.O.U. 1,1, at 79 (Jan. 5, 1976);
Germany, Decree No. 76,988 of Jan. 6, 1976, art. 11, D.O.U. 1,1, at 149 (Jan. 7,
1976).
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40 to 60 percent of such excess taken as an average over 3 years. tl
It is a penalty and, in accordance with figures published by the
Government, very few companies make these high remittances.
The Brazilian Minister for Planning has indicated that for the
last 3 years, 1971-1974, the average remittances have not ex-
ceeded 5.5 percent of registered capital.12
There are reasons for these low remittances. In the first
place, the reinvestment procedure is very interesting to locally
established companies as it can be accomplished without any tax
implication. The capitalization of profits increases the registered
foreign investment without any tax, and allows for an increased
remittance to be made, if so desired, in future years. Another
cause for this reinvestment is the continuous need for funds in
Brazil to comply with the demands of the growing market and
with the expansion of existing facilities. While the development
of Brazil continues at the amazing pace which it has held during
the last 10 years, MNCs do not find it expedient to make remit-
tances of dividends and profits as these remittances would deprive
them of funds required locally.
But it is also possible to comment differently on these low re-
mittances of dividends, and this the more radical voices against
foreign capital do quite often. 13 It has been stated that no MNC
would possibly consider itself satisfied with such a low rate of
profit from its investments in Brazil were it not for the fact that
MNCs are obtaining other remittances which are not officially
made known. The accusation of price manipulation is then made,
in an attempt to show that the MNC has the possibility of remit-
ting profits from Brazil by an adjustment in the price of its ex-
ports to Brazil, or on the exports of its Brazilian subsidiaries to
the parent company.
Loans to Brazilian companies, including the subsidiaries of
MNCs, also have to be registered with the Central Bank. These
loans have to be for a term periodically established by the Cen-
tral Bank, and at rates of interest also acceptable to it and in
accordance with prevailing rates in the international market.
11 Lei de Capital Estrangeiro, art. 43 § 1, supra note 2. See also GARLAND,
supra note 2, at 162.
12 Brasil Social, a statement made by the Minister for Planning, Jogo Paulo
dos Reis Velloso, before the Parliamentary Commission for the Examination of
Salary Policies of the House of Representatives, Sept. 24, 1975.
See TRks TEAS (1975), a collection of three statements made by the Min-
ister for Planning and published by the Secretariat of Planning.
13 Kandell, Brazilians Voice Growing Fear of Dominance by Multinationals,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 1976, at 35, col. 1.
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At the moment, the minimum period for a foreign loan to a Bra-
zilian company is 5 years, and remittances of principal can only be
made proportionately to the term of the loan. One of the accusa-
tions made against MNCs is that they are in a better position
than native Brazilian companies because they can avail themselves
of foreign loans, as they have access to the international and Euro-
dollar markets. A loan so contracted has the advantage that the
local Brazilian company has to consider only the difference in the
exchange rate at the time payments of interest and principal be-
come due, and consideration has to be given to the fluctuation of
the interest rate as against the fluctuation of the local currency due
to inflation. In the past, it has been more advantageous to accept
foreign loans and to be subject to a different rate of exchange, as
this rate has been consistently below the inflation rate prevailing
in Brazil. In any case, to make it possible for Brazilian companies,
especially those of medium and smaller size, to avail themselves of
foreign loans, the Central Bank has authorized local investment
banks to make use of foreign credit lines to lend the equivalent in
cruzeiros to local companies. The local company then accepts
the fluctuation of the exchange rate but the cost to it of the loan
does not quite compare with the loan taken by the subsidiary of an
MNC as the Brazilian company has to pay a fee to the bank for its
guarantee of the foreign loan. In any case, new sources of capital
have been made available to local companies and wise use has been
made of them to enable Brazilian concerns to expand at the rate
required by the development of the country and of the local and
export market.
The entry of an MNC into the Brazilian market can be ac-
complished either by the creation of a new company and the setting
up of its required physical facilities, or by the acquisition of an
existing concern. It can be an outright purchase or a joint ven-
ture, with the MNC in a majority or minority position. Some
years ago, a joint venture was looked upon with disdain, as it was
thought that the natives were not in a position to join an MNC in
a business venture. Another reason for the reluctance to effect
a joint venture was the different policies of the Brazilians and
the MNC in regard to the destination of the profits derived from
the business. In the case of the MNC, the profits could all be
used in the expansion of the business if so required, their distribu-
tion in the form of dividends being dependent on the demands of
the local company. If Brazilians were participating in the venture,
they might demand the distribution of some, if not all, of the prof-
its obtained, thereby curtailing the advancement of the business. The
[Vol. 8:311
BRAZIL
different mentalities of management were also causes for the re-
luctance to enter into a joint venture. Today the position has
changed and many joint ventures have been established. For
the MNC, this also has the advantage that local knowledge and
habits may become more readily available thus allowing for in-
creased progress of the new or expanded venture.
There have been signs that the government is somewhat con-
cerned with this kind of take-over of Brazilian companies by MNCs.
Some years ago, a decree-law was issued making it mandatory for
any such acquisition to have the prior approval of the government.
But this decree-law was never officially published so it has not
come into effect.14 Nevertheless, some members of the govern-
ment, especially the Minister for Industry and Commerce, have ex-
pressed the view that any major acquisition by an MNC of an exist-
ing Brazilian concern should be approved by the government before
it becomes final. Some cases have been known in which the
government stepped in and prevented the consummation of deals
already in their final stages. One of them, the Philips-Consul
case,15 was widely reported in the press and denials had to be is-
sued that, by its disapproval of the deal, the government had
changed its mind in regard to foreign capital in the country. The
government's contention is that when a Brazilian company obtains
financial or tax benefits it expressly agrees to submit any major
change in its shareholding to the prior approval of the department
concerned. It is certainly correct that this condition is standard
as far as the Council for Industrial Development (CDI) is con-
cerned, but it is no less correct to say that the law provides for a
penalty if there is an infringement, and that penalty is the pay-
ment of all exempted taxes and other benefits. If the foreign
company taking over a Brazilian firm, in this situation, accepts
the penalty, there should be no valid reason to prevent the deal.
It is an accepted fact that the government has not changed its
mind in regard to foreign capital and has no intention of changing
the present rules of the game. The latest statements on the part
of the more important Ministers are to that effect. Speaking
before the Subcommittee organized by Congress to examine the
activities of MNCs in Brazil, the Minister for Planning confirmed
the views expressed in the Second Development Plan of Brazil
(1974-1979) and indicated quite clearly that Brazil welcomes
14 For a report, see the Brazilian newspaper Folha de Sao Paulo, May 29,
1973, at 17.
15 Stalled Acquisition in Brazil Raises Key Questions about Government Policy,
BUSINEss LATIN AMERICA, Aug. 27, 1975, at 273.
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foreign capital but expects that the MNCs will abide by local laws
and accept the policies of the government in regard not only to
their activities but also to the development of their Brazilian sub-
sidiaries.16 The rules of the game, such as they are known and
contained mainly in Law No. 4131 as it presently stands, will not
be changed, and the only step that the government is considering
taking is that of indicating to MNCs the activities and the loca-
tions which are favored by the government. This is a very reason-
able attitude and confirms the value of providing MNCs and
local interests with guidelines clearly spelled out and maintained
over long periods.
In spite of this, there is a definite attempt to support and help
develop the Brazilian company, the company in which the majority
of voting stock, or control, rests in the hands of nationals. This
is provided by special financing conditions given to these com-
panies which, in many ways, place them in a more advantageous
position in regard to the MNCs established in the country. But
this has been so for some years and it is not expected that any
change will occur. It is not a change of the policy already es-
tablished in regard to foreign capital, nor is it a reduction of the
welcome afforded to MNCs, but only the expression of the feeling
that to compete with MNCs the local purely Brazilian company
must be given financial support and other facilities. The cheaper
credit being extended to Brazilian companies may take different
forms. In the first instance, one should refer again to Law No.
4131, which already in 1962 stated very clearly that credits and
financing provided by official banking and credit institutions
normally could only be given to Brazilian companies and only
exceptionally to companies under foreign control. The principal
finance organization of Brazil, the BNDE (National Bank for
Economic Development), a wholly owned government bank, has
made it a rule to provide credit facilities only to those companies
which have control in Brazilian hands. Even the rule that the
majority of voting stock should be in the hands of Brazilians is
now not enough - the requirement being that actual control should
be in their hands.17 The BNDE has created three subsidiaries
16 As Multinacionais e a Estrategia de Desenvolvimento, a statement made by
the Minister for Planning, Jolo Paulo dos Reis Velloso, before the Parliamen-
tary Commission for the Examination of Multinational Corporations of the
House of Representatives, Oct. 14, 1975. See Tils TEMAS, supra note 12.
17 NORMAS REGULADORAS DO PROGRAMA DE OPERAblS CONJUNTAS, art. 2,
attached to BNDE Resolution 451/74.
Resolution 451/74 is an internal regulation of the BNDE, enacted in accordance
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which have been authorized to take part as stockholders in Bra-
zilian companies and also to provide them with financing, not
only for development projects, but also for projects deemed to be
of special interest to the Brazilian economy. These subsidiaries
are designed especially for basic and development industries, and
for the mechanical or capital goods market. The fear has been
justly expressed that by accepting this kind of financial help,
the Brazilian companies may be changing from private to govern-
ment hands, thereby increasing the participation of the State in
the economy of the country. There is no doubt that there has
been considerable growth of State control in private business.
With the exception of some well known areas and activities
in which foreign participation is not allowed, all the rest is free
for investment on the part of MNCs. The way the government
proceeds to obtain the kind of investment it thinks advisable to
the country is to give incentives of a tax 'and fiscal nature for
those it approves. These incentives range from an exemption
from an import duty on goods and equipment brought into the
country to a tax holiday for those new businesses established in
the more under-developed parts of the country. There are a
number of worthwhile incentives for the transfer to Brazil of oper-
ating factories if their activity in Brazil will help expand the ex-
port market for their products. One of the main concerns of the
government at the present time is for a great expansion of Bra-
zilian exports and for this purpose a number of tax and fiscal
incentives have been granted. The transfer of operating indus-
trial units can be made without any import duty if approved by
the government, and the profits derived from the sale abroad of
its production are not included in the taxable income of the local
company. This is also applicable to the exports of any other
industry or activity so that exports have become paramount in a
number of concerns. All goods produced for export are not locally
taxed; in other words, they are exempt from the local value added
taxes known as IPI and 1CM. The profit made on their sale
abroad is not added to the taxable income of the company. The
result of this policy has been that Brazil has freed itself from its
dependence on exports of primary products and raw materials,
and is now a country to be contended with in the world. During
the first half of this century, Brazil relied exclusively on the ex-
with the Statutes of the BNDE art. 14, item 1(b), approved by Decree No.
73,713 of March 1, 1974, D.O.U. 1,1, at 2337 (March 4, 1974), as amended by
Decree No. 74,011 of May 6, 1974, D.O.U. 1,1, at 5189 (May 7, 1974).
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ports of coffee. Today, besides minerals, agricultural products
exported from Brazil include soy beans, sugar, cotton and others;
coffee still representing a valuable part but no longer the domi-
nant factor that it used to be. The export of manufactured products
has increased year by year and every attempt is being made to
have exports grow still more. There is no question that if any
MNC is interested in establishing itself in Brazil, it should care-
fully consider the possibilities of utilizing Brazil not only as a
center to supply a growing internal market but also as the basis
for exports to other countries, principally those with which Brazil
enjoys a favorable tax treatment, as with the countries of LAFTA. 8
Something should be said in regard to the transfer of tech-
nology to Brazil. From Brazil's point of view, this is certainly one
of the main advantages of having MNCs in the country, as they
bring with them a much greater knowledge of advanced technical
means and ways of utilizing them in an expanding economy. In
the very old days, when the industrial revolution started in Brazil,
this was one of the best ways to extract high returns from an
investment. Royalties for the use of patents and trademarks were
just business expenses as was technical assistance. Even the first
attempts to tax companies in Brazil did not have the desired re-
sult of reducing the high profits some MNCs were already extract-
ing from their investments in Brazil. It was only in 1958 that the
Minister of Finance issued an order limiting to 5 percent of sales
the payments for both technical assistance and patents and trade-
marks.' 9 This limit was the maximum, and it was scaled down in
accordance with the activity to which it referred, with a minimum
of 1 percent. The maximum limit for payment for the use of trade-
marks was 1 percent. Until then, and for many years previously,
the payments and remittances to foreign licensors could be made
in accordance with agreements entered into between the interested
parties with nearly no interference from the authorities. After
1962, when the registration of these remittance agreements be-
came mandatory,20 the position became more difficult as the Cen-
tral Bank required much more information than had previously
been supplied. But, compared to today, it was still easy and sim-
ple.
18 Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay,
Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
19 Portaria No. 436 of Dec. 30, 1958, a regulation issued by the Minister of
Finance.
21 Lei de Capital Estrangeiro, art. 3(b), 9, supra note 2. See also GARLAND,
supra note 2, at 153, 155.
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Then came the National Institute for Industrial Property
(INPI)21 and the position changed considerably. The INPI
stated that it would require full information in regard to the
technical assistance to be paid for and it would also examine
the amount to be paid even if it fell within the limits previously
established by the Minister of Finance. In September 1975, the
INPI issued its Regulation No. 15 and it became obvious that
the INPI was determined to have the last word in regard to all
transfer of technology to Brazil. Only that which the INPI
considers worthwhile for the country will be allowed, and pay-
ments will be possible only if they are within the limits which the
INPI will establish case by case. Full information will have to be
supplied by the licensor, and the licensee will also have to satisfy
the INPI that it has the ability required to fully absorb the new
technology within the period of the agreement, which cannot
exceed 5 years. The policy clearly stated is that the licensee,
during this period, will acquire the technical information so that
after the license expires the Brazilian company will be in a posi-
tion to continue the manufacture of the goods for which it ac-
quired the necessary foreign technology. No restrictions on the
use of this acquired technology are acceptable and this has the
result that the Brazilian company will be in a position to com-
pete with the former supplier of technology in other countries of
the world. The effect that this new policy has had is disastrous
as many MNCs which possess advanced technology have simply
refused to supply it either to their local subsidiaries or to others
interested in the subject. In the opinion of many, these new
provisions of the INPI are harmful to the country and will have
the reverse effect of that expected; in other words, that all ad-
vanced technology will not be transferred to Brazil. The argu-
ment of the INPI is that if some MNCs will not make this trans-
fer, others will. There is undoubtedly considerable competition
going on in Brazil between MNCs of different nationalities and
it is possible that the INPI is right in its new policy. Time will
tell. At the moment, in any case, the fact is that to obtain the
approval of any technical assistance agreement has become very
difficult and time consuming. And this approval is essential for
any remittances to be made and for the amounts due to be
considered as an ordinary business expense of the local company.
This is one of the problems facing American MNCs in Brazil
21 The INPI was established by Law No. 5648 of Dec. 11, 1970, 7 Colec*o
84 (1970).
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in regard to their subsidiaries. A provision in Law No. 4131
prohibits the payments of royalties for the use of patents and/or
trademarks if the voting control of the Brazilian company is in
the hands of the licensor either directly or indirectly.22 The
same, or nearly the same, applies to the payment of fees for the
supply of technical assistance. In these cases, the fees may be
paid if the agreement is approved by the INPI, but the amount
so paid is not an ordinary business expense to the Brazilian com-
pany, meaning that the amount is added to the taxable income of
the company. Furthermore, the same amount is added to the profits
distributed to the recipient company and this, coupled with a
regular remittance of dividends, may make the total subject to
the supplementary tax thus causing an unreasonable cost to all
involved. For the American MNC, the problem is increased be-
cause, as I understand it, it is possible for the Internal Revenue
Service to allocate to the technical assistance provided, or to the
patent and trademark, a certain return on which the American
MNC will be taxed in the United States.23 This problem has
caused considerable concern and attrition but, in all fairness, it
must be said that the impossibility of these payments has not
caused a reduction either in the foreign investment in Brazil or
in the expansion of existing facilities.
MNCs are highly criticized all over the world for the price
manipulation upon which, it is said, they rely heavily in order to
obtain undisclosed profits from their subsidiaries. It is indeed
possible to adjust prices for the export or import of commodities,
where minimal variations can have considerable effects. The
same, on a higher scale, may also be applicable to the exports to
the MNCs in the developing countries, of parts and components
of products manufactured by the subsidiary. And, if the sub-
sidiary exports to the parent company, the same is also possible
at the time the prices for the goods are established. In Brazil,
this possibility also exists, although its success is somewhat re-
duced. In the first place, Decree-Law No. 37 of November 18,
1960,2A makes it an offense to indulge in under or over-invoicing
and establishes a high fine if it is proved that this occurred. At
22 Lei de Capital Estrangeiro, art. 14, supra note 2. See also GARLAND, supra
note 2, at 156.
23 Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 902.
24 Decree-Law No. 37 of Nov. 18, 1966, art. 169, 7 Coleq o 56 (1966).
For a brief description of the procedure and penalties involved, see generally
J. NABUCO & I. ZANOTTI, A STATEMENT OF THE LAWS OF BRAZIL IN MATTERS AF-
FECTING BUSINESS 16 (3d ed. supp., 1965).
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the same time, for the export from or import into Brazil, there is a
department in the Bank of Brazil, namely CACEX,25 with au-
thority to examine the prices stipulated by the parties. By now,
CACEX has considerable knowledge of world prices and of inter-
company prices so that, even though variations may occur, the
differential margin cannot be too wide. There is always the case,
naturally, of a new product, the world price of which is not yet
established. One other way in which the Brazilian government
can limit the ill effects of this kind of manipulation of prices is by
issuing orders for "prices of reference" to be adopted by the
Customs authorities in determining the import duty to be paid.
This presents the possibility of avoiding dumping practices which
on occasion are tried but are quickly done away with.
Exports by MNCs from Brazil may present a problem both
for them and for the host country. Whatever the incentives
provided for by local law in regard to exports, it may be that the
policy of the parent company is against such activity as it may
interfere with arrangements established in other countries. This
is one of the problems facing the Brazilian authorities and all
attempts are being made to have the local subsidiary of the
MNC determine by itself the conditions under which exports
may become possible. This, again, would take from the parent
company the control over the subsidiary which seems to be es-
sential for the existence and growth of MNCs. This can be an
area of conflict, but in Brazil the MNCs have cooperated whole-
heartedly with the government and have accepted the need to
export both to the countries of the parent companies and others.
In this sense it has been possible for a number of MNCs to
supply the parent company with parts and components and entire
product lines required for the expansion of the MNC in its
country of origin. The benefits provided in Brazil for such ac-
tivities make this arrangement very attractive.
Brazil also boasts an antitrust law,26 modeled after the Sher-
man Act of the United States. It was enacted in September 1962
and should be accepted as an indication of the feeling then prevail-
ing in the country against MNCs. Since then, a few poor attempts
have been made to apply the law, but nothing much has come of
such efforts. It is clearly difficult for the government to apply the
law, since one of its present policies is to obtain the growth of Bra-
2 Carteira de Comercio Exterior (Foreign Trade Department) of Banco do
Brazil, S.A.
21 Law No. 4137 of Sept. 10, 1962, 7 Cole o 147 (1962).
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zilian companies by way of mergers and consolidations so that
they achieve a size enabling them to complete with MNCs. In
the present circumstances, all the provisions of the antitrust law
have to be put aside to enable this growth of local companies. In
regard generally to foreign companies and MNCs, the attempt is
to prevent them from entering into agreements clearly contrary both
to the policy of the government and to the reasonable commercial
interests of Brazilian companies. Otherwise, the law has not yet
made itself felt.
The Brazilian government has stated quite clearly that it pre-
fers direct investment to foreign loans. This is a problem to some
MNCs when their policy is to under-capitalize their subsidiaries.
In a special situation in Brazil, when a request for tax incentives
is made, such as exemption from import duties on plant and equip-
ment to be brought to Brazil, the government department involved
may establish that at least one-third of the value be paid by a
direct investment, with not more than two-thirds being financed
from abroad either by the MNC itself or by other sources. Direct
investments carry with them the right to a permanent transfer of
profits, and it is clear that with a transfer of 12 percent net every
year, the parent MNC will benefit heavily from its investment
in Brazil as long as the local venture is a profitable one. In the
case of financing, even if for a period of 8 years as is now quite
common, the principal would be liquidated and Brazil would not
carry any other burden after that time.
Loans must be serviced through interest. This problem in
Brazil is also an interesting one. The basic local assumption is
that a company should not be allowed to pay a higher interest
rate than that prevailing at the time in the country where the loan
originates. Naturally, these rates can vary. For a long time it
was thought to be more appropriate to Brazil to allow foreign
loans with a fixed rate of interest. The variable rate was not
sufficiently understood. But the fixed rate enabled the parent
MNC to buy participation in the loan with a higher rate of interest
and thus reap as a windfall gain the difference between the rate
of interest on the loan taken by it to buy the participation and
the rate which the Brazilian subsidiary was paying to service the
loan initially contracted. This is a possible means for MNCs to
increase the return on their investment in a developing country
and until this kind of practice is dealt with by the government
not much can be done against them.
The Brazilian government exercises considerable authority in
the granting of permission to incur foreign loans as one of the
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means it utilizes to control the country's balance of payments.
This control is also used to foster loans in respect to activities
which the government considers of interest to Brazil, and even to
grant an exemption from tax on the interest in certain cases.
To qualify for this exemption the loans must be for a period of not
less than 8 years.27 In other cases, the government grants to the
taker of the loan, namely the Brazilian company, whether or not an
MNC subsidiary, a financial benefit equal to 85 percent of the
tax on the interest so that for the Brazilian company the expense
of the interest is considerably reduced.2 As a proper receipt
for the tax at source is normally issued by the taxing authority,
in the case of a number of American MNCs, it might become
possible to utilize this receipt as a tax credit in the United States.
This is one instance of the imagination of Brazilian officials ap-
plied to ordinary business.
One other problem which the MNC faces when considering a
joint venture with a Brazilian national is that of the protection of
the minority shareholders. Brazilian law gives very poor protec-
tion to a minority and a prominent public figure in Brazil once
said that in his country arithmetic does not always have the same
meaning as in other countries: In Brazil, he stated, 51 is equal to
100. It is so in many cases as the Brazilian company law as it
presently stands does not offer to a minority shareholder any sub-
stantial enforceable rights. When a limitada is organized a better
position may be obtained for the minority partner, but this form
of business organization is not always fully understood in the
United States and so is refused by the interested parties. It is
possible to provide in the articles and by-laws some protective
provisions for a minority stockholder but this again is thwarted by
the official banks and banking institutions. These then consider
that the foreign stockholder has veto rights which go against the
full control of the company by Brazilian nationals and refuse to
extend the credit which otherwise the company might have ob-
tained. It is a difficult situation but one with which one has to
live for the time being, as a new company law is being discussed.29
The draft of this new law has been circulated and it contains
27 Decree-Law No. 1215 of May 4, 1972, art. 1, 3 Coleq~o 8 (1972); Banco
Central do Brasil Resolution No. 300 of Sept. 13, 1974, item I, D.O.U. of
Sept. 18, 1974.
28 Decree-Law No. 1411 of July 31, 1975, art. 1, 5 Coleqo 11 (1975); Banco
Central do Brasil Resolution No. 335 of Aug. 5, 1975, D.O.U. 1,2, at 2965
(Aug. 13, 1975).
29Projeto de Lei No. 2,559/76, published in DIARIO DO CONGRESSO NACIONAL,
1, Aug. 7, 1976.
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many interesting provisions. It is much more modern and up-
to-date, and its adoption, which could occur this year, will provide
Brazilian business with a very interesting means to achieve their
objectives.
When considering where to locate its business in Brazil, an
MNC has to examine various possibilities. In the great cities
such as Sao Paulo, life is becoming constantly worse due to
pollution, traffic problems and the lack of better qualified em-
ployees. The local government is attempting to prevent the crea-
tion of new establishments as it considers that these will only
increase the problems with which the city is faced. The "social
cost" of such a new establishment is too high and the state gov-
ernment is allied with the municipal authorities in an attempt to
divert new ventures from Sio Paulo and to direct them to other
cities in the state where conditions are much better than in the
capital city. This then presents to MNCs another problem,
namely that of acquiring land for their venture. If the land is
within the urban perimeter of the city there is no problem, as a
purchase of land within the city is always possible. But if the
area is outside the city limits and is considered as rural land,
then approval from the federal government is required as there
exists in Brazil a law prohibiting foreigners and foreign firms
from purchasing rural land unless a project for its development is
approved.30 In this case, although the local company may be
considered by law a Brazilian firm, if the majority of voting shares
is in the hands of a foreign concern, then for this purpose the
company is deemed to be foreign .31
One of the interesting points to be considered by an MNC
when starting to do business in Brazil is that of the profit ob-
tained by the seller of the shares of an existing company. If the
seller is a person, the profit does not attract any tax.32  If the
seller is a company, then the profit has to be added to its taxable
30 Law No. 5709 of Oct. 7, 1971, 7 Coleqlo 33 (1971), as regulated by Decree
No. 74,965 of Nov. 26, 1974, 8 Coleclo 355 (1974).
In order to obtain the approval of a project for the development of rural
land, it is necessary to submit the relevant documents to the appropriate author-
ities. Foreign companies authorized to operate in Brazil and Brazilian com-
panies with the majority in foreign capital may only acquire rural property when
it is destined for agrarian, livestock, industrial or colonization projects, in con-
nection with statutory objectives. These projects must be previously approved
by the Ministry of Agriculture, after hearing the federal authority responsible
for the development of the respective region. When the project is industrial
the Ministry of Industry and Commerce must be consulted.
3i Law No. 5709, supra note 30, art. 1 §1.
32 Brazilian Income Tax Law, supra note 7, art. 22, item Z.
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income. 33 In Brazil, capital gains made by a person on the sale
of shares or "quotas" are not taxable. 34 If the MNC were to
sell its interest in Brazil with a profit, this profit would only be
subject to the same 25 percent withholding tax at source which is
applicable to remittances of dividends and interest. 35 There have
been a number of cases in Brazil of MNCs liquidating or reducing
their investment in the country, with the sale of their investment
either to another MNC or to local parties, and the remittance of
the capital gain has been effected without any problem after the
25 percent tax was paid.
There is a provision in Law No. 4131 to the effect that if
the balance of payments of Brazil becomes difficult, then the
authorities have the right to reduce the amount of dividends that
can be remitted. This provision, fortunately, has not yet been
applied and even though Brazil is suffering with other nations
of the world the effects of the oil crisis, it is not expected that a
situation will arise that will make it necessary for the provision
to be applied.
In spite of this possible restriction, it is a fact that foreign
investment in Brazil on the part of MNCs has been growing
steadily. But this is in regard to foreign investment in general.
The trend of investment from the United States has been de-
creasing. In accordance with a statement of the Planning Minis-
ter, the total foreign investment of the United States in Brazil was
reduced from 48 percent to 34 percent during the period 1969-
1974, as compared with investments from MNCs based in
Europe, which increased from 30 percent to 40 percent, and of
Japan, which increased in the same period from 3 percent to 10
percent. 37  It becomes quite clear that there is competition from
MNCs of various sources, and this should be to the benefit of
Brazil. If MNCs bring to the host country their financial re-
sources and their technical advancement, they also create new
and better jobs requiring more sophisticated methods and knowl-
edge. This is a gain to the host country which must be utilized
to the full.
Summing up, it can be said that the co-existence of MNCs and
a developing country with liberal views has been beneficial for
33 Supra note 7, art. 127.
34 Supra note 7, art. 22, item Z.
35 Supra note 7, art. 344, item I.
36 Lei de Capital Estrangeiro, art. 28, supra note 2. See also GARLAND supra
note 2, at 159-60.
31 Supra note 16.
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both of them. The MNCs have grown and prospered and, on
the whole, have behaved quite well. As for the country, there
can be no doubt that benefits have been derived from the pres-
ence of the MNCs, not only in the greater number of jobs and
more up to date technology, but also in management principles
and lines of credit. On the whole, it has been a most satisfactory
experience which should continue as the imaginative traits of the
Brazilians make good use of all the advantages that the presence
of the MNCs in their country can provide.
